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We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for
stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game
theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and captures important
dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We consider seven different permit allocation
schemes. Two “pragmatic schemes” allocate permits according to a uniform emission reduc-
tion quota, five “equitable schemes” allocate permits based on some normative criteria
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I. Introduction
Emission permits have been proposed as an efficient instrument to tackle both
national and international environmental problems. Recently, this market-based
*
 Michael Finus (corresponding author): Institute of Economic Theory, Department of
Economics, University of Hagen, Profilstr. 8, 58084 Hagen, Germany, michael.finus@fernuni-
hagen.de. Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera: Environmental Economics and Natural Resources
Group, Wageningen University, Department of Social Sciences, Hollandseweg 1, 6706
KN Wageningen, The Netherlands, juan-carlos.altamirano-cabrera@wur.nl. The authors would
like to thank two anonymous referees and the co-editor Mariana Conte Grand for their comments
that substantially improved the quality of this paper. They would like to acknowledge that
these comments influenced in particular sections IV and V. The paper has also benefited from
discussions with Alfred Endres and Ekko van Ierland. Needless to say, the authors assume
responsibility for all remaining errors.
 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS20
instrument has gained increasing attention in the context of the Kyoto Protocol,
aiming at controlling global warming. Since greenhouse gas emission affects all
countries, it can be expected that a sufficient high participation in permit trading
will guarantee a well-functioning market. However, there has been much debate
about the distributional effects of different permit allocation schemes. Rose et al.
(1998) took a prominent lead in this discussion, classifying different allocation
schemes, clarifying their motivation and analyzing their impact on different
countries. The discussion initiated many other papers (e.g., Kverndokk 1995 and
Böhringer et al. 2002) dealing with various notions of fair allocations of permits. It
is recognized that not only efficiency but also fairness aspects may play an impor-
tant role for the participation and success of a global warming treaty. However, this
literature only studies the impact of different allocation schemes on net abatement
costs of individual participants (abatement costs plus/minus the outlay/receipt
from permit trading). Hence, not much can be concluded about whether and which
countries have an incentive to join an international environmental agreement (IEA)
and whether such a treaty will be self-enforcing. In order to analyze participation
and stability, two more steps are necessary.
First, not only abatement costs but also benefits from joint abatement policies
have to be taken in consideration. Only this gives a complete picture of the basic
incentives to participate in an agreement. That is, we can test whether cooperation
is not only globally but also individually rational. We call a treaty individually
rational if each participant receives a net benefit exceeding that in the non-
cooperative status quo. As shown for instance in Eyckmans et al. (1994) and
Germain and van Steenberghe (2003), not all permit allocation schemes that are
deemed to be fair guarantee individual rationality to all participants. For instance,
a permit allocation based on per capita may appear to be fair (“one-man-one vote”),
but leads to very large transfers from industrialized to developing countries that
may violate the interests of donors.
Second, even though individual rationality may be seen as a necessary condition
for cooperation, it is by no means a sufficient condition. Since abatement constitutes
a public good, countries may be better off not participating in an individually
rational IEA, saving abatement costs and benefiting from the efforts of signatories.
Consequently, in view of the fact that there is no supranational institution that can
enforce a global treaty, IEAs must also be self-enforcing. We check this with the
concept of internal and external stability which has been widely applied in the
game theoretical literature on IEAs (e.g., Barrett 1994 and Carraro and Siniscalco
1993).1  Different from this literature, however, we combine our game theoretical
1
 For an overview of this literature see Finus (2003).
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analysis with an empirical model that captures twelve world regions. That is, we
neither model heterogeneity in a stylized way as for instance in Finus and
Rundshagen (1998) and Hoel (1992), nor do we consider stylized transfer rules as
for instance in Botteon and Carraro (1997) and Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003).
The objective of this paper is to test whether stable coalitions exist under
various permit allocation schemes and if this is the case whether they improve
upon the non-cooperative outcome. We consider two “pragmatic scenarios” that
allocate permits according to a uniform emission reduction quota and five “equity
scenarios” that allocate permits based on some normative criteria frequently
discussed in the literature. Different from Bosello, Buchner and Carraro (2003),
Eyckmans and Finus (2003) and Weikard, Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera (2004)
that test stability of outcome-based allocation rules, we consider allocation based-
rules.2  It turns out that permit trading can improve upon the success of self-
enforcing climate agreements but pragmatic are superior to equity schemes. Thus,
moral motives may not always be a good guide for the design of effective and self-
enforcing treaties.
In the following, we introduce the game theoretical and empirical module in
Section II. We motivate our permit trading schemes and discuss some fundamental
features in Section III and report about results of our stability analysis in Section
IV. Section V wraps up with a summary and draws some conclusions.
II. The model
A. Game theoretical module
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, countries
or regions (i∈I={1,...,N}) decide on their membership strategy; in the second stage,
they choose their abatement strategies. In the first stage, we assume that countries
have two membership strategies: strategy σi = 0  means “I do not want to join the
agreement” and σi = 1  means “I want to become a member of a climate treaty”.
Countries that announce σi = 0 form a singleton coalition and those that announce
2
 This categorization is due to Rose et al. (1998). Permits may be allocated based on some
criteria aiming at influencing the initial allocation (allocation-based), the final allocation after
trade has taken place (outcome-based) or important factors associated with trading (process-
based). Since governments and their representatives usually bargain on the allocation of permits
(though they may determine their bargaining position by conjecturing the outcome or some
variables associated with the process of trading), we believe that allocation-based rules should
receive sufficient attention in the analysis.
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 This should not be confused as meaning that the mapping of membership strategies into
coalition structures would not be unique.
σi = 1 become members of a non-trivial coalition (i.e., a coalition of at least two
members). Hence, a vector of announcements σ = (σ1, σ2, …, σN), σ∈Σ, leads to
coalition structure c = (s, 1,..., 1), c∈C, with s either a non-trivial coalition if at least
two countries have announced σi = 1  or s = {i} if either all countries have announced
σi = 0  or only one country has announced σi = 1. Hence, there exist 4096 different
membership vectors but “only” 4084 different coalition structures in the context of
twelve players (regions).3  If s = {i}, this is called the “singleton coalition structure”
and if s = I, this is called the “grand coalition structure”.
In the second stage, countries choose their abatement strategies qi based on
the following payoff function:
                                                                                                                                          (1)
assuming a concave benefit function from global abatement, Bi, and a convex
abatement cost function from individual abatement, Ci. For a given coalition
structure c, we assume that non-signatories (σi = 0) pursue their self-interests,
maximizing pii with respect to qi, taking the abatement level of all other countries as
given. Assuming an interior equilibrium, this leads to the following first-order
condition:
where primes denote derivatives. In contrast, signatories (σi = 1) are assumed to
maximize the aggregate welfare of their coalition. This leads to the following first
order conditions:
N
´
i i i ii s i 1
B (´ q ) C (q )
∈ =
=∑ ∑
The simultaneous solution of the first order conditions of non-signatories and
signatories leads to abatement vector q*(c). This abatement vector can be interpreted
as a partial Nash equilibrium between coalition s and the singleton players (Chander
and Tulkens 1997). Hence, in equilibrium, ´ ´* *i i j jC (q ) C (q )= for all i and j that belong
to s. That is, the abatement vector of the coalition is efficient for the coalition. Of
course, this does not extend to outsiders. Consequently, the grand coalition
N
i i i i ii 1
B ( q ) C (q )
=
pi = −∑
i s∀ ∉N ´i i i ii 1B ´( q ) C (q )= =∑
,
, (2)
.i s∀ ∈ (3)´
´
´ ´
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structure (s = I), representing full cooperation, chooses a globally optimal abatement
vector and the singleton coalition structure (s={i}), representing no cooperation,
corresponds to the “classical” Nash equilibrium. Any other coalition structure
may be seen as partial cooperation.
If q*(c) is unique for all c∈C, then the payoff vector pi(q*(c)) with pii (q*(c))
=
N * *
i i i ii 1
B ( q (c)) C (q (c))
=
−∑ is unique in the second stage. In section II.C, we will
argue that this is indeed the case and that q*(c) lies in the interior of the abatement
space. At this stage, it suffices to notice that pi(q*(c)) represents the case without
permit trading. In the case of permit trading, payoffs have to be modified. For
simplicity, we assume that permits are only traded among cooperating countries, i.e.,
among coalition members (see section V for a discussion of this assumption).
Hence, a coalition member’s payoff can be written as
 ,
where p is the permit price and iq (t) is the assigned abatement resulting from some
allocation under a particular permit trading system t∈T. The second term on the
right hand side of equation (4) is positive if a country is a permit seller ( *i iq (t) q (c)< )
and negative if a country is a permit buyer ( *i iq (t) q (c)> ). The price of permits is
equal to marginal abatement costs in equilibrium and follows immediately from the
first order conditions of signatories in (3). Thus, the “final” payoff ipi% in (4) can be
interpreted as the payoff from cooperation without transfers, pii, plus or minus a
transfer that depends on the allocation of abatement, iq (t) . In section IV, we will
discuss various permit schemes that determine iq (t) . At this stage, it suffices to
notice that because pi(q*(c)) is unique also *i i(q (c), q (t))pi% is unique for each coali-
tion structure c∈C and any permit scheme t∈T.
Taken together, payoffs to country i depend on the coalition structure c∈C
determined in the first stage of the game and on abatement strategies q∈Q and the
permit trading systems t∈T chosen in the second stage of the game, pii(c, q, t).
Since abatement q follows from the assumption of joint welfare maximization of
coalition members and the allocation of permits follows from the assumption about
a particular permit trading system, we can thus define stability of coalition structure
c as follows:
Stable Coalition Structures. Coalition structure c∈C resulting from
announcement  σ∈Σ   i s  ca l led  s tab le  i f  for  a l l  i∈ I ,  ≠* ´i iσ σ :
− −
≥* * ´ *i i i i i i( , ) ( , )pi σ σ pi σ σ assuming some permit trading scheme t∈T and that
q∈Q  follows from the assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition
members.
* * *
i i i i i(q (c), q (t)) (q (c)) p (q (t) q (c))pi = pi − ⋅ −% (4)
´
´
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Obviously, our definition implies that a coalition structure is called stable if
membership strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. This definition is similar to
the concept of internal and external stability: in equilibrium, no signatory has an
incentive to leave the coalition by changing its announcement from *i 1σ =  to
´
i 0σ =  (internal stability) and no non-signatory has an incentive to join the coalition
by announcing ´i 1σ =  instead of 
*
i 0σ = (external stability). The advantage of our
definition is that existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed. The reason is that the
singleton coalition structure can always be supported as a Nash equilibrium:
suppose all countries announce σi = 0, then no single country can change this
coalition structure by unilaterally changing its membership strategy. The advantage
of the other definition is that it allows separating stability into two dimensions.
Hence, when discussing stability in the following, we distinguish between internal
and external stability.
It is evident that the definition of stable coalition structures implies voluntary
participation since signatories can leave their coalition if they find it more attractive
to free-ride and non-signatories can join the agreement if this pays.
B. Empirical module
In this section, we explain our empirical module - called STACO-model. Since
the model has been laid out in much detail in Finus, Altamirano-Cabrera and van
Ierland (2004), we briefly describe here only its main features. The main idea of
STACO is to calibrate the following payoff function:
T
t
i i it t it it
t 1
(q) (1 r ) (B (q ) C (q ))−
=
pi = + −∑ ,                                                                      (5)
where the philosophy behind the model comprises three items. First, the model
should reflect important dynamics of climate models. Therefore, STACO considers
a period of 100 years, starting in 2010 and bases its calibration on the widely
known DICE-model of Nordhaus (1994) for the development of global emissions
and concentration. Second, in order to make the model interesting for a game
theoretical analysis, there should be a sufficient number of different players.
Therefore, STACO uses abatement cost estimates of Ellerman and Decaux (1998)
for twelve world regions. For global benefits and regional benefits from abatement
(in the form of reduced damages), STACO uses estimates of Fankhauser (1995)
and Tol (1997).
Third, the model must be simple enough to be tractable for a game theoretical
analysis. Therefore, STACO assumes stationary abatement strategies, fits the
parameters to this specification, leading to the following discounted payoff function:
´
´
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N 3 21 1
i i B b i c i i i i3 2i 1(q) q q q=  pi = γ µ δ − δ ⋅α ⋅ + ⋅β ⋅ ∑ ,                                                   (6)
where qi is the total abatement over 100 years, 
100
i itt 1
q q
=
= ∑ . The global benefit
parameter is µB, the regional benefit parameter is γi, representing the shares of the
different world regions in global benefits, i0 1≤ γ ≤ , 
N
ii 1
1
=
γ =∑ and αi and βi are
regional abatement cost parameters. The parameters δb and δc capture discounting
in STACO; in the case of δb  it further includes the decay of greenhouse gases. In
our “standard case” we assume a discount rate of 2 percent.4  Note that µB δb
represents global marginal benefits. It turns out that µB δb=37.4 US$ per ton of
carbon, a figure that is much in line with other studies (e.g., Plambeck and Hope
1996). The regional parameters reflect differences of twelve world regions: USA,
Japan (JPN), European Union (EU-15), other OECD countries (O-OECD), Eastern
European countries (EE), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries
(EEX), China, India, dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil and “rest of the world”
(ROW). We use the abbreviations in brackets in the following.5  The parameters
are listed in the Appendix in Table A.1 and their implications are visualized in
Figure 1 and 2 below.
Figure 1 lists regions in descending order of regional benefit shares. It is evident
that the large industrialized regions are the main beneficiaries of global abatement
whereas EEX, DAE and Brazil receive the smallest share of global benefits.
From Figure 2, it is evident that marginal abatement costs never intersect.
Moreover, marginal abatement costs vary widely: China and USA have the flattest
curves whereas Brazil as well as Japan have the steepest. Roughly speaking, those
regions with low initial emissions (e.g., Brazil and Japan) face steep marginal
abatement cost curves (see Table A.1 in the Appendix) since cheap abatement
options have already been exploited and substitution to more effective abatement
technologies is expensive. For regions with high initial emissions (e.g., China and
USA) just the opposite holds.
4
 For a discount rate of 2 percent, δb=1385 and δc=43.1  in STACO. The parameter µB  represents
damages in terms of a loss of GDP for a doubling of greenhouse gas concentration, expressed in
percentages. We take µB = 0.027 (meaning a 2.7 percent loss) from Tol (1997). In section 4,
these assumptions will be subject to a comprehensive sensitivity analysis.
5
 EU-15 comprises the 15 countries of the European Union as of 1995. O-OECD includes
among other countries Canada, Australia and New Zealand. EE includes for instance Hungary,
Poland, and Czech Republic. EEX includes for example the Middle East Countries, Mexico,
Venezuela and Indonesia. DAE comprises South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore.
ROW includes for instance South Africa, Morocco and many countries in Latin America and
Asia.
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Figure 1. Regional benefits from global abatement
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Figure 2. Marginal abatement cost functions
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C. General features of the model
In this section, we discuss some general features of our model, relating to the
game theoretical and the empirical module.
First, in section II.A, we pointed out that a unique abatement vector for
each coalition c∈C guarantees a unique payoff vector. Considering the
empirical specification of the payoff function (see equation (6)), it is evident
that regions have a dominant strategy because the first order conditions of
signatories are 2B b i c i i i ii s ( q q∈µ δ γ = δ α ⋅ + β ⋅∑ ) and those of non-signatories
are 2B b i c i i i i( q qµ δ γ = δ α ⋅ + β ⋅ ).  Thus,  uniqueness  is  evident.  An  interior  solution
follows  from  two  pieces  of  information.  a) ´i iC (q )  is  an  increasing  function,
´
i iC (q 0) 0= = and ´ii s B∈ =∑ ´B b i i B b ii s B 0∈µ δ γ ≥ = µ δ γ >∑ ,hence *iq 0> i I∀ ∈   and
for any coalition structure. Notice that this implies that even in the singleton
coalition structure, corresponding to the “classical” Nash equilibrium, some
abatement is undertaken compared to the business-as-usual scenario, and hence
BAU Nash
i ie e> i I∀ ∈ , where 
BAU
ie is defined as emission level in the business-as-
usual scenario and Nashie as emission level in the Nash equilibrium. b) Generally, we
can choose a sufficient high upper bound maxiq to guarantee an interior solution.
However, in our model abatement means to reduce emissions from the business-
as-usual emission level, BAUie . Hence, it seems sensible to require max BAUi iq e≤ . Since
it follows from 2B b i c i i i ii s ( q q∈µ δ γ = δ α ⋅ + β ⋅∑ ) that *iq  takes on the largest value
if s=I (corresponding to the “classical” global optimum), we only have to check
whether * BAUi iq (s I) e= ≤ holds for all i∈I. In our model, it turns out that this is
indeed the case.
Second, in our model, superadditivity holds. That is, whenever a country j
joins coalition s, so that coalition structure changes from c to c% , aggregate welfare
of countries s {j}∪  increases, i j ii s i s { j}(c, t) (c) (c, t)∈ ∈ ∪pi + pi < pi∑ ∑ % . The reason
is simple. First, the aggregate payoff to coalition s and s {j}∪ is not affected by the
kind of permit trading scheme: permit trading only affects individual payoffs of
coalition members through transfers but transfers add up to zero. (Recall that non-
signatories are not involved in trading.) Second, outsiders I \{s {j}∪ } have a
dominant strategy. Hence, they will not change their abatement level in c%  compared
to c.  Hence, if we let qs, qs∪{j}  and qj  denote the abatement vector of signatories
before and after country j joined coalition s and abatement of country j, respectively,
then 
s s { j}j
i j ii s i s { j}qq q
max max max
∪∈ ∈ ∪
pi + pi < pi∑ ∑ must hold.
Third, in our model, cooperation generates positive externalities. That is,
whenever a country j joins coalition s, so that coalition structure c changes to c% ,
outsiders k s {j}∉ ∪ gain k k(c) (c)pi < pi % . From the first order conditions of
´ ´´
´
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signatories, it is evident that abatement of each member increases because the
sum of marginal benefits increases from B B ii s∈µ δ γ∑ to B B ii s { j}∈ ∪µ δ γ∑ . Hence,
global abatement increases, outsiders´ benefits increase from c to c%  but their
abatement costs remain the same.
Fourth, superadditivity together with positive externalities imply that global
welfare is raised if participation is gradually increased. Nevertheless, membership
matters. That is, global welfare may well be different in two coalitions s1 and s2 that
are of the same size but comprise different members.
Fifth, in the Introduction we mentioned that an agreement must be individually
rational and self-enforcing to be stable. Evidently, we check the self-enforcing part
through Definition 1 of stable coalition structures. Less evident is that this
automatically implies to check also for individual rationality. The reason is that
internal stability implies individual rationality (but not vice versa). Suppose coalition
s is not individually rational for member i, then member i can leave the agreement
and because of the positive externality property (see item 3 above), he will be
(strictly) better off than in the singleton coalition structure (provide s\{i} comprises
at least two members).
Sixth, generally, the advantage of participating in a coalition is that this increases
global abatement. Moreover, own abatement efforts are matched by others. This
increases benefits from global abatement but also increases abatement costs. The
relative size of both effects determines whether it pays to join a coalition. As a
tendency, the higher participation in an agreement, the less attractive it becomes
to join a coalition and the more attractive it becomes to leave a coalition due to the
strict concavity of the payoff function. Therefore, stable coalitions are usually
only small.
Seventh, participation in a stable agreement will also depend on membership
and on the permit trading system. Since countries have different benefit and cost
functions, joint welfare maximization may imply a very asymmetric distribution of
the gains from cooperation. For instance, a coalition member, say i, with a flat
marginal abatement cost function will have to contribute more to abatement than a
member, say j, with a steep marginal abatement cost function. If i has also lower
marginal benefits than j, then i may well be worse off from cooperation or at least
receives a low payoff. Consequently, it may pay country i to free-ride. This may be
different if country i receives a transfer from country j which may be accomplished
via a permit trading system that allocates a sufficient amount of permits to country
i. In our model, a region i is for instance EE, DAE, China and India and a region j for
instance EU-15 and Japan.
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III. Fundamentals about permit trading
A. Motivation of permit schemes
In section II.A, we observed that payoffs in a coalition structure c are affected
by the global abatement level N *ii 1q (c)=∑  and the individual abatement level
*
iq (c) ,
N * *
i i i i ii 1
B ( q (c)) C (q (c))
=
pi = −∑ . This holds for non-signatories. For
signatories,  payoffs  also depend on the assigned abatement level iq (t) that
follows from the allocation of permits under some permit scheme t,
*
i i i ip (q (t) q (c))pi = pi − ⋅ −% . Noting that emission permits of region i, ie , mean to
allocate a fraction i0 1≤ λ ≤ of the total amount of permits ii s e∈∑ , to each member
i, i i ii se e∈= λ ∑ , ii s 1∈ λ =∑ , and recalling that abatement is defined as
BAU
i i iq e e= − in our model, 
*
i ii s i s
e e
∈ ∈
=∑ ∑ with * BAU *i i ii s i s i se e q∈ ∈ ∈= −∑ ∑ ∑ ,
then the allocation of abatement can be expressed as follows:
                                                              .                                                                      (7)
Thus, different permit schemes t∈T  can be related to different weights λi. In
the literature, several schemes have been proposed of which we consider seven in
this paper. We only briefly comment on these schemes and refer the reader to a
more extensive discussion of their motivation to Cazorla and Toman (2000) and
Rose et al. (1998). The first two schemes are called “pragmatic schemes”, the next
five are called “equitable schemes”. The names that we attach to each scheme are
shown in the first row and the mathematical specifications of weights are displayed
in the second row in Table 1. For the grand coalition, weights (expressed as
percentage) are displayed for each region in the subsequent rows. This gives a
first idea of the relative impact of different schemes in terms of weights, though it
has to be pointed out that weights are different in other coalition structures. The
base data for computations of weights is provided in the Appendix, Table A.2.
Pragmatic schemes
Our pragmatic schemes belong to so-called sovereignty rules because they do
not much interfere with the status quo. Both schemes assume that all members
receive emission permits that represent the same percentage from some base
emission level. This implies to allocate uniform emission reduction quotas to each
member. Such a scheme has been applied in the Helsinki Protocol on Sulfur
Reduction in Europe and in many other IEAs. However, different from these treaties,
BAU BAU *
i i i i i
i s i s
q (t) e e q (c)
∈ ∈
 
= − λ −  ∑ ∑
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Table 1. Permit schemes and shares in the grand coalition
Regions                     Pragmatic schemes                        Equitable schemes
Quota Quota Egalitarian Historical Ability Ability Energy
BAU Nash responsibility to pay to pollute efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BAU
i
BAU
i
i s
e
e
∈
∑
Nash
i
Nash
i
i s
e
e
∈
∑
i
i
i s
Pop
Pop
∈
∑
( )
( )
1BAU
i
1BAU
i
i s
e
e
−
−
∈
∑
( )
( )
1
i i
1
i i
i s
GDP Pop
GDP Pop
−
−
∈
∑
( )
( )
1BAU
i i
1BAU
i i
i s
e Pop
e Pop
−
−
∈
∑
( )
( )
1BAU
i i
1BAU
i i
i s
e GDP
e GDP
−
−
∈
∑
USA 20.2 19.8 4.8 1.9 0.5 1.6 9.8
Japan 4.7 4.8 1.9 8.2 0.3 2.8 26.8
EU-15 11.7 11.7 5.8 3.3 0.6 3.4 18.4
O-OECD 5.2 5.3 2.2 7.4 1.1 2.9 8.2
EE 4.3 4.5 1.9 9.0 4.4 3.0 2.1
FSU 8.4 8.3 4.5 4.6 8.2 3.6 1.3
EEX 10.2 10.6 24.9 3.7 14.8 16.7 3.6
China 19.7 19.4 20.9 1.9 18.5 7.2 1.2
India 5.3 5.4 17.8 7.3 37.0 23.1 2.0
DAE 3.4 3.5 3.2 11.1 3.2 6.4 6.4
Brazil 1.1 1.1 3.0 35.2 3.6 18.6 16.0
ROW 5.9 5.8 9.1 6.5 7.8 10.6 4.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: All figures are expressed as a percentage. BAUie = emissions in the BAU scenario for country i;
Nash
ie = emissions in the Nash equilibrium for
country i; Popi = level of population in country i; GDPi = level of GDP in country i.
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in our model such quotas can be traded as intended under the Kyoto Protocol.
“Quota BAU” (scheme 1) assumes base emissions in the business-as-usual
scenario, BAUie ; “Quota Nash” (scheme 2) assumes base emissions in the classical
Nash equilibrium, Nashie , corresponding to those in the singleton coalition structure.
Both emission levels may be interpreted as the status quo before an agreement is
signed. The alternative assumptions allow us to check whether our results are
sensitive to the choice of the base-line emission level.
From Table 1, we observe that weights between scenario 1 and 2 differ only
slightly. This is because the Nash equilibrium implies only a minor emission
reduction from BAU-emissions (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). Since base line
emissions are strongly concentrated in USA and China, those regions receive the
highest weights. We now turn to our “equitable schemes”.
Equitable schemes
 “Egalitarian” (scheme 3) allocates emission permits on a per capita basis. This
rule acknowledges that all men should have the same right to emit: “one man one
vote”. Evidently, energy exporting countries (EEX), China and India, receive the
highest shares in the grand coalition since a large portion of total population lives
in these regions.
“Historical responsibility” (scheme 4) allocates permits inversely to BAU-
emissions because those countries that have contributed to current greenhouse
gas concentration should contribute more to mitigate this problem. Thus, weights
under this scheme are the mirror image of “Quota BAU”, and therefore Brazil and
dynamic Asian economies (DAE) receive high weights.
“Ability to pay” (scheme 5) allocates permits inversely to welfare levels
measured as gross domestic product (GDP). This rule argues that wealthier nations
should take on more responsibility in global climate change control than poorer
nations. However, this rule may also be seen as a vehicle of development aid
through environmental policy by allocating more permits to poorer nations. Again,
those regions that receive high shares of emission permits are those mentioned
under the “Egalitarian scheme” and are mainly developing countries.
The scheme “Ability to pollute” (scheme 6) is similar in spirit to “Historical
responsibility”, except that weights are not based on emissions but on emissions
per capita. It has also some connection to “Egalitarian” where weights are based
on population. Thus, this scheme may be defended by arguing that every man has
the same responsibility for preserving the climate system. Since the USA has the
highest emission per capita ratio, they receive the lowest weight. In contrast, due
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to low current emissions and high population density, developing countries receive
high weights under this scheme.
“Energy efficiency” (scheme 7) allocates emission permits inversely to the
emission/GDP ratio. It therefore rewards regions with “advanced environmental
technology” like Japan and European Union (EU-15) but gives low weights to
China, India and Eastern European countries (EE) that have “dirty industries”.
B. Illustration of permit schemes: Some fundamental relations
In this subsection, we illustrate some of the implications of the seven different
permit trading schemes in Table 2. As a reference point, we also display the base
case of no permit trading. Again, we choose the grand coalition to illustrate some
fundamental relations. For each scenario, the gains from cooperation are measured
in relation to the singleton coalition structure, corresponding to the classical Nash
equilibrium. Since the payoff to a region can be interpreted as its payoff without
trading plus or minus a transfer (see section II.A), we also display transfers as
implied by the various permit schemes. A positive number means to pay a transfer
(permit buyer) and a negative number means to receive a transfer (permit seller). In
order to gain some insights about the dimension of trading, we also display total
transfers, that is, the sum of all positive or negative numbers. Moreover, in order to
get an idea about the distribution of the gains from cooperation, we compute the
standard deviation of the gains from cooperation.
From Table 2 the following observations are interesting:
First, the total gain from cooperation in the social optimum is with 4,071 billion
US$ large given the fact that the global payoff in the Nash equilibrium is only 1,960
billion US$.
Second, the standard deviation of the gains from cooperation is generally
large. However, there are significant differences: The two pragmatic schemes show
the lowest standard deviation and some of the equitable schemes have a very high
standard deviation, exceeding that without permit trading to a large extent. The
large spread of the gains also shows up in large transfers implied by the various
permit trading schemes. Obviously, the equity schemes imply a major reshuffle of
the gains from cooperation through permit trading, but most of them replace the
asymmetry without trading through another asymmetry that is even larger.
Third, neither the base case of no permit trading nor any of the permit schemes
implies that cooperation is profitable for all participants. There are always at least
two regions that are worse off than in the Nash equilibrium. For the equity schemes,
individual rationality is sometimes severely violated for almost half of all regions.
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34Table 2. Gains and transactions under various permit schemes: Grand coalition
                       No permit                      Pragmatic
                          trading                         schemes
Quota BAU Quota Nash Egalitarian Ability to pay Energy intensity
(1) (2) (3) (5) (7)
Gains Trans-  Gains Trans- Gains Trans- Gains Trans- Gains Trans- Gains  Trans- Gains  Trans-  Gains Trans-
Fers fers fers fers fers fers fers fers
USA 1,241 - 721 520 577 664 -4,709 5,950 -5,716 6,957 -6,200 7,441 -5,815 7,056 -2,941 4,182
Japan 1,236 - 926 310 976 260 -30 1,266 2,160 -923 -596 1,832 286 950 8,703 -7,467
EU-15 1,569 - 1,051 518 1,037 531 -1,006 2,574 -1,917 3,486 -2,857 4,426 -1,862 3,430 3,370 -1,801
O-OECD 133 - 17 115 45 87 -1,029 1,162 767 -634 -1,421 1,554 -785 918 1,068 -936
EE -33 - -68 35 -24 -9 -936 904 1,487 -1,520 -63 31 -561 528 -860 827
FSU 269 - 189 81 179 90 -1,190 1,460 -1,165 1,434 196 74 -1,483 1,752 -2,289 2,559
EEX 38 - -475 513 -330 368 4,710 -4,672 -2,746 2,784 959 -922 1,811 -1,773 -2,786 2,824
China -866 - 820 -1,686 698 -1,564 1,233 -2,099 -5,424 4,558 679 -1,545 -3,563 2,696 -5,696 4,830
India 83 - 378 -295 378 -294 4,765 -4,682 1,002 -919 11,411 -11,328 6,499 -6,416 -826 910
DAE 33 - 88 -55 116 -83 30 3 2,845 -2,813 -2 35 1,177 -1,145 1,150 -1,117
Brazil 103 - 27 76 45 58 691 -588 12,141 -12,038 921 -817 6,283 -6,180 5,327 -5,223
ROW 265 - 397 -133 375 -110 1,542 -1,278 637 -372 1,044 -780 2,082 -1,818 -149 414
Total 4,071 - 4,071 2,168 4,071 2,058 4,071 13,319 4,071 19,219 4,071 15,393 4,071 17,330 4,071 16,546
Standard
deviation 651 - 442 - 399 - 2491 - 4,450 - 3,886 - 3,446 - 3,787 -
Note: All figures are expressed in billion US$.
Historical
responsibility
(4)
Ability
to pollute
(6)
Regions Equitable schemes
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For the base case, it is not surprising that individual rationality is violated for EE
and China because their marginal benefits and abatement costs are far below
average levels. Hence, these regions contribute above average to global pollution
control but benefit only below average. Obviously, none of the permit schemes
simultaneously repairs this deficiency for these two regions, letting alone the
violation of individual rationality of other regions.
Fourth, even though we can immediately conclude that the grand coalition is
not a stable coalition structure because individual rationality is violated under all
schemes, it may nevertheless be possible to form smaller coalitions that are
individually rational. Nevertheless, also for smaller coalitions stability may be a
problem as will be apparent from the next section.
IV. Stability analysis
In this section, we present results of our stability analysis. We start with the
“standard case” in section IV.A, reflecting the parameter values as reported and
discussed in section III. In section IV.B, we report on the results of our sensitivity
analysis.
A. Standard case
For each scenario, we test all 4084 coalition structures for stability with an
algorithm programmed in Matlab. In the base case without permit trading, it turns
out that more than 1000 coalition structures are externally stable but only 14 coalition
structures are internally stable. None of the 13 non-trivial coalition structures (i.e.,
including a coalition of at least two members) that are internally stable are also
externally stable and hence no non-trivial coalition structure is stable. On the one
hand, this stresses that internal stability is the main problem of stability and therefore
we focus in particular on this part of stability in the following discussion. On the
other hand, this stresses the strong free-rider incentives in general, but, in par-
ticular, in the context of heterogeneous regions.
Under the scenario “Quota-BAU”, this changes somehow. Now 28 coalition
structures are internally stable of which two are also externally stable. The first
coalition structure includes a coalition between the European Union (EU-15) and
China and the second a coalition between India and the “Rest of the World”
(ROW). In order to explain the driving forces of permit trading, we exemplarily have
a closer look at the coalition between EU-15 and China in Table 3, though similar
relations are also true for other stable coalitions.
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Table 3. Coalition between the European Union and China: No permit trading and
permit trading under the Quota BAU scenario
Regions Payoffs Payoffs ICM ICM
 (without (with  (without (with
permit permit permit permit
trading) trading) trading)  trading)
gton bln US$ bln US$ bln US$ bln US$ bln US$
(over over over over over over
100 100  100 100 100 100
years) years years years years years
*
iq iq ið ið%
USA 16 - 8.5 683 683 - 137.8 -132.6
Japan 1 - 6.5 559 559 - 107.9 -25.0
EU-15 8 20 11.1 733 595 137 -268.6 -131.3
O-OECD 2 - 1.3 111 111 - -13.5 -52.3
EE 1 - 0.5 42 42 - -19.4 -40.8
FSU 5 - 2.5 215 215 - -13.7 -64.2
EEX 1 - 1.1 97 97 - -21.3 -139.2
China 46 34 11.1 -6 131 -137 118.0 -19.3
India 3 - 1.9 160 160 - -30.2 -11.2
DAE 1 - 0.9 81 81 - -18.1 -33.5
Brazil 0 - 0.6 50 50 - -0.4 -18.7
ROW 4 - 2.5 217 217 - -14.3 -24.1
World 87 - - 2,942 2,942 - - -
Note: ICM means incentive to change membership measured as 
− −
−
´ * * *
i i i i i i( , ) ( , )pi σ σ pi σ σ . See
section II.A.
Total
emission
reduction
Marginal
abatement
costs
Transfers
US$/ton
From Table 3, it is evident that without permit trading the coalition between the
EU-15 and China (indicated in italics in the first column) is not internally stable
because China would gain by leaving this coalition (indicated in the second last
column). Clearly, without transfers, EU-15 is the main beneficiary in this coalition
at the expenses of China. Because China is a cheap provider of abatement, also
USA and Japan have an incentive to join this coalition (indicated in the second
last column) and therefore this coalition would also not be externally stable.
With permit trading, the situation changes. Under the “Quota BAU” scenario,
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China receives a sufficient amount of emission permits ( iq is low; see equation 7)
that can be sold to EU-15. Thus, China receives a large transfer of 137 billion US$
as indicated in the column “Transfers”. Thus, whereas before there was a slack of
enforcement power on the side of EU-15 and lack on the side of China without
permit trading, this asymmetry is now somehow mitigated with permit trading, as
this is evident from the last column. Now China would loose from leaving the
coalition. Also no outsider has an incentive to join the coalition. In particular, USA
and Japan have no interest anymore in joining this coalition because transfers to
China would exceed their gains from cooperation.
For the other coalitions and permit trading schemes, results are summarized in
Table 4.
In Table 4, the singleton coalition structure, which is stable by definition, and
the grand coalition structure, which is not stable under any scenario, are listed as
benchmarks to measure the success of stable coalition structures. Also the reference
case without permit trading is listed. It is evident that under the pragmatic schemes
the number of internally stable coalition structures is higher than in the base case
without permit trading but under the equity schemes this is substantially lower.
This confirms the conjecture from the grand coalition in section III.B that equity
schemes may remove an asymmetry but replace it by a different and even stronger
asymmetry. Different degrees of asymmetry also show up in terms of stable coalition
structures (internally and externally stable coalition structures). Only under the
pragmatic schemes, we find stable coalition structures. Those stable coalition
structures improve upon the non-cooperative situation in environmental and
welfare terms, though they close the gap between no and full cooperation only to
a small extent. The results also confirm that membership matters and that from the
number of participants success cannot be inferred. For example, the coalition
between EU-15 and China is more successful than any other stable coalition,
though the coalition between EU-15, Eastern European countries (EE) and India
counts one more member.
B. Sensitivity analysis
A typical feature of empirical work is that results depend on assumptions
about policy scenarios and on parameter values, which are subject to some
uncertainty. In terms of policy scenarios, we considered above two pragmatic and
five equity allocation schemes of permits. It is evident that a much longer list of
schemes could be generated and checked for stability. We refrain from this exercise.
However, given that the two pragmatic schemes perform rather well whereas all
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Table 4. Stable coalition structures
 Scenario Number of Stable coalitions Global Global
internally emission payoff
stable coalitions reduction
(i) singleton coalition - stable 55 1,960
(ii) no permit trading 14 no stable coalitions - -
(iii) (1) quota BAU 28 {EU-15, China} 87 2,942
{India, ROW} 60 2,107
(2) quota Nash 53 {EU-15, EE, India} 68 2,372
{Japan, India} 61 2,151
(iv) (3) egalitarian 3 no stable coalitions - -
(4) historical
responsibility 1 no stable coalitions - -
(5) ability to pay 0 no stable coalitions - -
(6) ability to pollute 1 no stable coalitions - -
(7) energy efficiency 1 no stable coalitions - -
(v) grand coalition - not stable 256 6,031
Notes:  Global emission reduction = giga tons over 100 years. Global payoff = billion US dollar
over 100 years. Stable coalitions means internally and externally stable. Scenarios 1 and 2
correspond to the” pragmatic schemes” and scenarios 3 to 7 to the “equitable schemes”.
6
 This means that we tested 30 additional scenarios.
five equity schemes perform badly for our model, one may wonder whether a
combination of a pragmatic and an equity rule would perform better. Thus, we
tested a combination of every of the two pragmatic schemes with every of the five
equity schemes. We consider apart from a 50%/50% allocation rule of permits, also
a 25%/75% and 75%/25% rule.6 Surprisingly, we find no non-trivial coalition structure
that is stable. Apparently, the equity rules introduce too much asymmetry, or, put
differently, the asymmetry of the equity schemes cannot be sufficiently balanced
by the pragmatic schemes. Thus, the superiority of the pragmatic schemes over
the equity schemes in our model is confirmed by our sensitivity analysis.
In terms of parameters and given the large number of parameters that enter our
model, some selection is necessary for a sensitivity analysis. We believe that the
highest uncertainty concerns benefits from global abatement and discounting.
Hence, in terms of benefits, we conduct a sensitivity analysis where we uniformly
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raise the level of benefits from global abatement. That is, we raise the base value of
the global benefit parameter µB from 100 to 200 and 300 percent.7  In terms of the
discount factor, we recall that our “standard case” assumed a discount rate of 2
percent. This is roughly in line with Weitzman (2001) who suggests that if a constant
discount rate has to be chosen, in the context of global warming, then a discount
rate of 2 percent or less is appropriate to capture long-term effects. This means that
we are at the upper bound. Hence, we test also for a discount factor of 1 percent
and - in order to get a more complete picture of the driving forces - consider
additionally also a discount rate of 3 percent. It is evident that discounting affects
not only benefits but also abatement costs. In line with more sophisticated models,
a lower (higher) discount rate means in our model STACO to put a higher (lower)
weight on benefits compared to abatement costs because of the long terms effects
of climate change. More specifically, a change in the discount rate affects the
benefit parameter δB and the cost parameter δc in STACO. Since both parameters
are level parameters (see equation (6); as this is also true for µB), only the change
of the relation δB / δc  is important. Hence, a discount rate of 1 percent has the same
effect as raising the global benefit parameter µB  from 100 to 120 percent and a
discount rate of 3 percent has the same effect as lowering the global benefit
parameter µB  from 100 percent to 85 percent.
Hence, taken together, our sensitivity analysis compares our standard scenario,
which is the 100 percent scenario, with a 85, 120, 200 and 300 percent scenario.
Table 5 summarizes the results that confirm our qualitative results from above.
First, the grand coalition, though it would raise global welfare substantially
compared to no cooperation, is not stable under all scenarios.
Second, without permit trading, there is now one stable coalition structure in
the 120, 200 and 300 percent scenarios that involves a coalition between Japan and
EU-15.8  This suggests that a sufficient high recognition of the benefits from
controlling global warming may improve upon the prospects of cooperation – a
conjecture confirmed for the pragmatic permit trading schemes. However, this
coalition only slightly improves upon the non-cooperative outcome: both regions
have steep marginal abatement costs and therefore only marginally increase
abatement efforts above non-cooperative levels.
Third, pragmatic permit trading schemes are superior to equitable schemes for
7
 Recall, µB = 0.027 in the base case and hence 200 (300) percent implies µB = 0.054  (µB =
0.081) which means a substantial increase in the valuation of the benefits from a reduction of
greenhouse gases. This is certainly a optimistic view with respect to the recognition of
environmental benefits by governments.
8
 It turns out that 120 percent is the lower benchmark for which this change occurs.
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis
Percentage Coalitions Scenarios Total
parameter emission
     µB reduction
No (1) (2) (3) gton bln US$
permit to (over 100 (over 100
trading (7)  years) years)
Singleton coalition structure x x x x 50 1,493
Coalition Japan, EU-15 - - - - 53 1,567
Coalition India, ROW - x - - 54 1,607
85 % Coalition Japan, India - - x - 55 1,641
Coalition EU-15, EE, India - - x - 62 1,814
Coalition EU-15, China - x - - 78 2,253
Grand coalition - - - - 234 4,656
Singleton coalition structure x x x x 55 1,960
Coalition Japan, EU-15 - - - - 59 2,056
100 % Coalition India, ROW - x - - 60 2,107
Base Coalition Japan, India - - x - 61 2,151
Case Coalition EU-15, EE, India - - x - 68 2,372
Coalition EU-15, China - x - - 87 2,942
Grand coalition - - - - 256 6,031
Singleton coalition structure x x x x 62 2,655
Coalition Japan, EU-15 x - - - 67 2,784
Coalition India, ROW - x - - 67 2,850
120 % Coalition Japan, India - x x - 69 2,909
Coalition EU-15, EE, India - - - - 77 3,199
Coalition EU-15, China - x - - 98 3,962
Grand coalition - - - - 284 8,053
Singleton coalition structure x x x x 87 6,161
Coalition Japan, EU-15 x - - - 92 6,453
Coalition India, ROW - x - - 93 6,588
200 % Coalition Japan, India - x x - 95 6,720
Coalition EU-15, EE, India - - - - 105 7,343
Coalition EU-15, China - x x - 133 9,045
Grand coalition - - - - 377 18,000
Global
payoff
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all scenarios. Apart from the singleton coalition structure, there is no stable coalition
structure under any equitable scheme but two or three under the pragmatic
schemes. Thus, our conclusion from above is confirmed that moral motivations
(i.e., equity concerns) may not always be a good guide for successful treaty-
making.
Fourth, in case there are stable coalition structures, they involve only small
coalitions and only marginally improve upon the non-cooperative outcome in
terms of global welfare and global emission reduction. Thus, even though a cleverly
designed permit trading scheme may balance some asymmetries between coalition
members, it cannot totally overcome strong free-rider incentives.
V. Summary and conclusions
We studied the effect of permit trading on the stability of global climate
agreements with a model that combines a game theoretical with an empirical module.
Table 5. (Continued) Sensitivity analysis
Percentage Coalitions Scenarios Total
parameter emission
     µB reduction
No (1) (2) (3) gton bln US$
permit to (over 100 (over 100
trading (7)  years) years)
Global
payoff
Singleton coalition structure x x x x 112 11,910
Coalition Japan, EU-15 x - - - 119 12.466
Coalition India, ROW - x - - 119 12,704
300 % Coalition Japan, India - x x - 122 12,950
Coalition EU-15, EE, India - - - - 135 14,094
Coalition EU-15, China - x x - 169 17,280
Grand coalition - - - - 470 33,903
Note:  “x” means stable and “−” means not stable. First column refers to “percentages of the
benefit parameter” µB. The 85 and 120 percent scenario correspond to a discount rate of 3 and
1 percent, respectively, as explained in the text.  Scenarios 1 and 2 correspond to the “pragmatic
schemes” and scenarios 3 to 7 to the “equitable schemes”.
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The game theoretical module models coalition formation as a two-stage game in
which regions choose their participation in an agreement in the first stage and their
abatement strategies in the second stage. Apart from membership, payoffs depend
on the permit trading scheme, implying different initial allocations of emission
allowances. The empirical module provided benefit and costs estimates for twelve
world regions. Though it captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation
over 100 years, it assumes stationary abatement strategies for game theoretical
tractability.
We considered seven different permit trading schemes that were divided into
two categories: “pragmatic” and “equitable” schemes. Pragmatic schemes are
closely related to the current status quo and allocate permits according to uniform
emission reductions from some base emission level. We considered emissions in
the business-as-usual scenario without abatement and those in the Nash equilibrium
as base lines. Equitable schemes could be motivated by different notions of fairness
that have been proposed in the literature as for instance “historical responsibility”
or “ability to pay”. From the many results we would like to mention three key
results.
First, the gains from partial and full cooperation would be very large in terms of
global welfare but also measured in environmental variables like global emission
reduction. However, the gains are quite unevenly distributed because of the large
heterogeneity between regions. Depending on the permit scheme, this inequality
can be mitigated, as for instance the pragmatic schemes do. However, the equitable
schemes frequently replace one type of asymmetry by introducing another
asymmetry, implying large transfers from one group of countries to another group.
For instance, a scheme that allocates permits on a per capita basis implies large
transfers from industrialized to developing countries.
Second, the large asymmetries under the equitable rules found for full
cooperation also showed up for partial cooperation, implying that there was no
stable coalition under equitable schemes. In contrast, some coalitions are stable
under the pragmatic schemes. Thus, our findings do not support the conjecture
that equity can enhance the success of agreements. Of course, this finding cannot
claim generality. Nevertheless, it provides an indication that equity principles alone
might not be able to offset strong-free-rider incentives. In fact, designing permit
trading schemes based on pragmatic principles may appear to be less fair but more
successful in mitigating the climate problem.
Third, even cleverly designed permit trading schemes that reduces the disparity
of the allocation of the gains from cooperation cannot overcome strong free-rider
incentives. In our model, only small coalitions turned out to be stable that improve
upon the status quo, though not much. Nevertheless, it became evident that the
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number of participants is not a good indicator for the success of treaties,
membership may be even more important. This suggests that when designing a
permit scheme for future agreements, identifying key players and inducing the
participation of those players should receive a high priority.
For future research, we would like to mention four items among many other
possibilities. First, we could drop the assumption of joint welfare maximization
within a coalition. The assumption implies that ambitious abatement targets are
implemented. This translates into instability of large coalitions because of high
free-rider incentives. Overall, it is likely that better results may be achieved if
members settle for less ambitious abatement targets. If the effect on participation
is strong enough, this may well compensate for modest abatement targets (Finus
and Rundshagen 1998). Second, we could drop the assumption that permits are
only traded among coalition members. This would closely resemble the clean
development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol where signatories can also
buy certified emission reductions from non-signatories. Obviously, this option
could reduce abatement costs of signatories and thus increase their welfare.
However, this option also increases welfare of non-signatories through transfers.
Thus, it is not evident whether such an option will raise self-enforcing participation
and the success of treaties. However, there is no doubt that a consistent treatment
of this issue will complicate the analysis substantially because the determination
of optimal abatement levels will have to consider all strategic aspects associated
with world wide trade. Third, though we already considered a substantially larger
number of actors than most climate models, twelve regions is nevertheless a small
number compared to the total number of countries world wide. From the theory of
public goods, we expect that a larger number of actors would enhace free-riding
problems. That is, our aggregation into 12 world regions means an optimistic view
to the possibilities of self-enforcing cooperation. However, currently, the problem
of such an extension is the lack of less aggregated empirical data. Fourth, we
limited the decision about participation to a one-shot decision for simplicity. A
more realistic and interesting assumption would allow for the possibility that
decisions can be revised at various points in time. It is evident that this would also
require giving up the assumption of stationary abatement strategies in order to
render the analysis relevant. On the one hand, this would allow accounting for a
change of benefit and abatement parameters over time which seems important in
the context of a long time horizon. On the other hand, we expect that already for a
setting with “only” twelve heterogeneous players, this would constitute a great
computational challenge as results for symmetric players and simple payoff func-
tions in Rubio and Ulph (2003) indicate.
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Table A1. Emissions, benefit and abatement cost parameters
Emissions Share of Abatement Abatement
                    Regions  in 2010 global cost  cost
(Gton) benefits parameter parameter
γi αi β i
1   USA 2.42 0.226 0.0005 0.00398
2   Japan 0.56 0.173 0.0155 0.18160
3   European Union (EU-15) 1.4 0.236 0.0024 0.01503
4   Other OECD Countries (O-OECD) 0.62 0.035 0.0083 0
5   Eastern European Countries (EE) 0.51 0.013 0.0079 0.00486
6   Former Soviet Union (FSU) 1 0.068 0.0023 0.00042
7   Energy Exporting Countries (EEX) 1.22 0.030 0.0032 0.03029
8   China 2.36 0.062  0.00007 0.00239
9   India 0.63 0.050 0.0015 0.00787
10 Dynamic Asian Economies (DAE) 0.41 0.025 0.0047 0.03774
11 Brazil 0.13 0.015 0.5612 0.84974
12 Rest of the World (ROW) 0.7 0.068 0.0021 0.00805
     World 11.96 1 - -
Note: Input data in STACO-model as described in Finus, Altamirano, Cabrera, van Ierland
(2004).
Appendix
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GDP
per capita
Table A2. Base data for allocation of permits
Regions Emissions Emissions Population GDP Emissions Emissions
 in BAU in Nash (2)(4) (3)(4) per capita  per unit
scenario scenario (5) (BAU- of GDP
(1) (1) scenario) (BAU-
 (6) scenario)
 (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(gton) (gton) (million of (billion (thousand (tons per (tons per
habitants) 1985 US$) 1985 US$) habitant) 1985 US$)
USA 2.4 226 305 8,845 29.0 79 0.03
Japan 0.5 55 124 5,584 44.9 45 0.01
EU-15 1.4 133 375 9,579 25.5 37 0.01
O-OOE 0.6 60 142 1,902 13.4 44 0.03
EE 0.5 51 120 405 3.4 43 0.13
FSU 1 95 287 501 1.8 35 0.20
EEX 1.2 121 1,602 1,650 1.0 8 0.07
China 2.4 221 1,340 1,021 0.8 18 0.23
India 0.6 61 1,145 458 0.4 6 0.14
DAE 0.4 40 207 972 4.7 20 0.04
Brazil 0.1 13 190 774 4.1 7 0.02
ROW 0.7 66 584 1,119 1.9 12 0.06
WORLD 11.9 1,140 6,421 32,810 - - -
Notes: (1) STACO calculations (Finus/Altamirano-Cabrera/van Ierland 2004). (2) population
in 2010 calculated from table 2.1 of World Bank (2002). (3) GDP in 2010 calculated from
DICE model and table 1.1 of World Bank (2002). (4) Data aggregated into STACO’s 12 regions
following Babiker et al. (2001). (5) Computed from column 3 and 4. (6) Computed from
column 1 and 3. (7) Computed from columns 1 and 4.
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